很久以來，

我曾經多次指出，

國軍目前的建軍方向，

大錯特錯！

這正是美國政客與民進黨狼狽為奸的惡果！！！

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買F-16戰機沒用？ 美智庫學者：既得利益團體賺飽飽

2026-02-22__22:49

https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20260222002366-260408

美國智庫「國防重點」亞洲事務主任高德斯坦（Lyle Goldstein）日前提到，雖然台灣在過去幾年，採購了包括刺針飛彈、標槍飛彈等非對稱武器，但他指出，無論在台北或華府，某些既得利益團體長期透過銷售，像是F-16戰機、美國舊型巡防艦等裝飾性強的武器，賺得盆滿缽滿。然而，面對解放軍的火力狂潮，這些武器幾乎派不上用場。

「國防重點」立場偏向現實主義與克制派。高德斯坦20日於該智庫網站，發布一篇題為《中國入侵台灣的可能性有多大？》的問與答文章。

在「為何台灣對兩岸戰爭準備不足？」的部分，高德斯坦指出，台灣在過去幾年有一些不錯的投資，包括購買刺針飛彈和標槍飛彈。這些非對稱武器在俄烏戰爭中，已被證明行之有效。不過，他話鋒一轉，認為從整體來看，情況並不特別令人振奮。

他寫道，美台的既得利益集團，透過交易F-16戰機和老舊的美國巡防艦等「裝飾性強的武器」（showy weapons）而獲利頗豐。這些武器面對解放軍的火力猛攻時，幾乎毫無用武之地。

一旦跑道被摧毀，台灣戰機恐無法起飛，而台灣海軍的大部分艦艇，預計將在碼頭被摧毀，或被困在港內動彈不得。台灣一些最鋪張浪費的項目，無論是建造潛艦、大型兩棲艦艇，抑或是反潛飛機，在戰略上都難以找到連貫合理的解釋。

除了利益因素，他也認為，台灣長期對所謂「精英軍種」，也就是空軍與海軍，存在「根深蒂固的偏好」，而地面部隊數十年來卻被忽視。至於機動式陸基反艦飛彈是否有效，目前仍不明朗。同樣地，近期重新強化台灣裝甲部隊的作法，也未必反映當今戰爭形態，所揭示的系統脆弱性問題。

從更根本層面來看，儘管有人談及「全社會韌性」，但高德斯坦提及，台灣仍抗拒全面軍事化。他說，台北領導人似乎一方面希望大陸不敢發動攻擊，另一方面則寄望美國在必要時「派救兵」，然而這2種假設均站不住腳。

高德斯坦提到，台灣民眾不願大規模加強島嶼防禦，這「完全可理解」。他繼而提出一個相對簡單且成本低廉的解方，即重整預備役訓練。然而，台灣社會似乎缺乏意願，去採取足以真正抵禦大陸，所需的那種軍事化程度。

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新聞來源：

How realistic is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

2026-02-20

https://www.defensepriorities.org/qa/how-realistic-is-a-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/

……

Why is Taiwan so unprepared for a cross-strait war?

Goldstein: Taiwan has made some good investments in the last few years, including in Stingers and Javelins, the same asymmetric weapons that have proven successful in the Russia-Ukraine War. Still, the larger picture is not particularly encouraging. Entrenched interests, both in Taipei and in Washington, have made bountiful riches from the trade in showy weapons like F-16 fighters and old U.S. frigates. These weapons will be all but useless against the PLA firepower onslaught.

Runways will be destroyed, preventing Taiwan fighters from ever taking off, while the bulk of Taiwan’s navy is expected to be destroyed at the pier or otherwise bottled up in port. Some of Taiwan’s most extravagant projects, whether building submarines or large amphibious ships or anti-submarine aircraft, defy any coherent strategic explanation.

Beyond profit, there is a long-standing and deeply entrenched bias in Taiwan toward the so-called elite service branches of the Air Force and the Navy, while ground forces have been neglected for decades. It is unclear whether the buildup of mobile, ground-based anti-ship missiles will be effective. Similarly, the new focus on recapitalizing Taiwan’s armored forces may not reflect changes in warfare that are demonstrating the vulnerability of such systems.

More fundamentally, Taiwan has resisted total militarization, despite some talk about “whole of society resilience.” Taipei’s leaders seem to hope that, on the one hand, China would not dare attack, and on the other, the United States would “send in the cavalry” as necessary. Neither assumption is justified.

It’s quite understandable that people in Taiwan do not want to massively fortify their island. A relatively simple and cheap fix is to reorganize military reserve training to make these formations more robust. But there seems to be little appetite in Taiwan for adopting the level of militarization that genuine defense would require against a rising superpower just 100 miles away.