盧勝彥如果已開悟了,明心見性了那他為何要在2002年為了彩虹山莊旁的小小土地開發糾紛而告上KING COUNTY縣政府﹗<br /><br /><a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=wa&vol=2002_app/47647-5&invol=3" target="_blank">http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=wa&vol=2002_app/47647-5&invol=3</a><br /><br /><a href="http://www.mrsc.org/mc/courts/appellate/110wnapp/110wnapp0092.htm" target="_blank">http://www.mrsc.org/mc/courts/appellate/110wnapp/110wnapp0092.htm</a><br /><br />有愛靠杯靠目的龜孫子說我移花接木,那乾脆把整個法院判決書PO上來<br /><br />Grandmaster Sheng-Yen Lu v. King County, No. 47647-5-I, (Slip Op., January 28, 2002).<br /><br /><br /><br />Jan. 2002 GRANDMASTER SHENG-YEN LU v. KING COUNTY 1<br /><br /> Cause No. 47647-5-I<br /><br /><br /><br /> [No. 47647-5-I. Division One. January 28, 2002.]<br /><br /> )<br /><br /> GRANDMASTER SHENG-YEN LU; ) No. 47647-5-I<br /><br /> WILLIAM KENNETH HALL; STEVEN )<br /><br /> HUGHES; and PHIL WILLIAMSON, ) DIVISION ONE<br /><br /> )<br /><br /> Appellants, )<br /><br /> )<br /><br /> v. )<br /><br /> )<br /><br /> KING COUNTY, CADMAN, INC., a )<br /><br /> Washington corporation; and )<br /><br /> WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, a )<br /><br /> Washington corporation, ) PUBLISHED OPINION<br /><br /> )<br /><br /> Respondents, ) FILED: January 28, 2002.<br /><br /> )<br /><br /><br /> Trial Court: Superior Court, King County,<br />No. 00-2-14446-6.SEA, Peter Jarvis, J., October 27, 2000.<br /> Sullivan & Thoreson, by Kevin Sullivan; Bricklin & Gendler, by<br />David Bricklin, for appellants.<br /> Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson, by Jerome Hillis, George Kresovich,<br />and Joseph Genster; Cairncross & Heplemann P.S., by Diana Shukis and<br />Alan Wallace; King County Prosecutors Office, by John Briggs and<br />Michael Sinsky, for respondents<br /><br /><br /><br /> COX, J. - The Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) generally provides the<br />exclusive means of judicial review of final land use decisions. /1<br />Here, Grandmaster Sheng-Yen Lu and others (the Neighbors) appeal<br />dismissal of this declaratory judgment action. This action seeks an<br />order directing King County to decide, prior to establishment of the<br />final configuration of mining activities, whether a conditional use<br />permit (CUP) will be required for a proposed mining project. Because<br />LUPA provides an adequate alternative remedy and this case is not ripe<br />for judicial review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in<br />dismissing the action. We affirm.<br /><br /> In 1998, King County, Weyerhaeuser, the state Department of Natural<br />Resources (DNR), and others agreed to the development and ultimate<br />donation for public use of certain property located in North Bend. In<br />the agreement, Weyerhaeuser agreed to develop the property as a gravel<br />mine using high performance standards to protect the environment. The<br />agreement further provided that Weyerhaeuser will ultimately donate the<br />land to be reclaimed from mining to DNR to be held in trust for the<br />County. The project is intended to protect public views and ultimately<br />transfer private land to long-term public ownership and forest use.<br /><br /> The subject property is located in a forest zoning district. Under<br />the King County Code, mining operations are allowed on forestry lands if<br />mining activities are more than "one-quarter mile from an established<br />residence" and do not use local access streets that abut lots developed<br />for residential use. /2 Otherwise, a CUP is required.<br /><br /> Cadman, Inc. is Weyerhaeuser's representative to implement the project.<br />Cadman submitted to King County's Department of Development and<br />Environmental Services (DDES) plans for mining the subject property at<br />two sites. The "Lower Site" plans that Cadman submitted identified three<br />improvements within one-quarter mile of a building on the property of<br />Grandmaster Lu. They are a 3.8 acre pond, a noise berm, and a drainage<br />swale.<br /><br /> DDES determined that, for purposes of the CUP ordinance, the building on<br />Grandmaster Lu's property is an "established residence." DDES initially<br />indicated that no CUP would be required for the project. DDES later<br />modified its position, indicating that it would decide whether a CUP was<br />needed when the County published a Draft Environmental Impact Statement<br />(DEIS). DDES has since indicated that a decision can only be made after<br />the final proposed configuration of mining activities is established.<br /><br /> The Neighbors claim that the pond, berm, and drainage swale in the<br />plans for the "Lower Site" are mining activities for purposes of the CUP<br />ordinance. Cadman and Weyerhaeuser dispute this, contending that these<br />improvements are either not part of their mining proposal or may never be<br />constructed.<br /><br /> The County released to the public a DEIS that included a list of<br />required licenses and permits for the project. It does not include a<br />CUP, as recommended by the consultant hired by the County to prepare the<br />proposed DEIS for the project. The DEIS analyzed four alternatives: (1)<br />no action, (2) mining activities on upper and lower portions of the<br />property, (3) a different configuration of mining activities on upper and<br />lower portions of the property, and (4) mining activities only on the<br />upper portion of the property. As Cadman pointed out to the County,<br />under alternatives (1) and (4) of the DEIS Weyerhaeuser would not be<br />obligated to donate the land at the lower site to DNR in trust for the<br />County. Thus, the Neighbors argue that the County would be biased<br />against those alternatives and would be inclined to permit alternative<br />(2) or (3) that would threaten the property of the Neighbors.<br /><br /> The Neighbors originally commenced a proceeding under LUPA challenging,<br />among other things, the County's failure to decide whether Weyerhaeuser<br />and Cadman must obtain a CUP. Weyerhaeuser, Cadman, and the County moved<br />to dismiss that action. In response, the Neighbors moved for voluntary<br />dismissal, which the court granted.<br /><br /> Shortly thereafter, the Neighbors commenced this declaratory judgment<br />action. The County, Weyerhaeuser, and Cadman again moved for dismissal,<br />which the trial court granted<br /> The Neighbors appeal.<br /><br /><br /> Declaratory Relief<br /><br /> Citing RCW 7.24.050, the Neighbors first argue that the trial court<br />incorrectly refused to consider this action. They claim a present<br />substantive ruling would "terminate the controversy or remove<br />uncertainty." We hold that the trial court properly exercised its<br />discretion by dismissing the action.<br /><br /> The Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) should be liberally interpreted in<br />order to facilitate its socially desirable objective of providing<br />remedies not previously countenanced by our law. /3 This principle has<br />long been tempered by the requirement that a "justiciable controversy"<br />exist before a court may substantively rule in such an action. /4 A<br />justiciable controversy is: (1). . . an actual, present and existing<br />dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible,<br />dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between<br />parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves<br />interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential,<br />theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of<br />which will be final and conclusive. /5 As we recently stated in<br />Neighbors and Friends of Viretta Park v. Miller, /6 another way<br />of stating the requirement is "a claim is ripe for judicial determination<br />if the issues raised are primarily legal and do not require further<br />factual development, and the challenged action is final." /7<br /><br /> One is not entitled to relief by way of a declaratory judgment if there is<br />available a completely adequate alternative remedy. /8 We review for<br />abuse of discretion a refusal to consider a declaratory judgment action.<br />/9 A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is<br />manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. /10 A court's<br />decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of<br />acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it<br />is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by<br />the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an<br />incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the<br />correct standard. /11<br /><br /><br /><br /> Adequate Alternative Remedy<br /><br /> We first consider whether the Neighbors have available a completely<br />adequate alternative to this declaratory judgment action. We hold that<br />they have such a remedy in LUPA.<br /><br /> Generally, LUPA is the exclusive means of judicial review of land use<br />decisions. /12 Turning first to that statute, there can be no serious<br />dispute that the ultimate decision by DDES that is at issue here will be a<br />"land use decision" within the meaning of the statute. That is because<br />that final determination will be one on an application for governmental<br />(County) approval before real property (the mine) may be developed, as<br />specified in RCW 36.70C.020(1).<br /><br /> Likewise, there can be no dispute that there has not yet been a<br />final determination by DDES on the application. As the Neighbors' prior<br />motion to dismiss the LUPA proceeding they commenced tacitly admits, such<br />a proceeding would be premature before DDES makes a final decision.<br /><br /> Much of the Neighbors' argument that their request for declaratory<br />relief is proper is premised on the assumption that LUPA could not<br />provide adequate relief at the appropriate time. But the lack of a final<br />decision by DDES at this time does not necessarily render a LUPA<br />proceeding less than a completely adequate alternative to this request<br />for declaratory relief.<br /><br /> In reviewing the statutory framework of LUPA, we note that the Legislature<br />has carefully defined "land use decision" in terms of a final<br />determination by the relevant body or officer with the highest level of<br />authority to make the determination. /13 This legislative choice of words<br />must mean something. We conclude that the most reasonable meaning to give<br />to this legislative choice is to conclude that courts should generally<br />defer review of decisions involving the use of land until such decisions<br />are final-that is when the highest body or officer has finally acted.<br /><br /> Our decision in Ward v. Board of Skagit County Comm'rs /14<br />is consistent with this view. There, property owners sought judicial<br />review under LUPA of the administrative denial of a zoning variance and<br />special use permit. Our court reviewed the statutory language of LUPA<br />and held that in order to obtain a final determination one must, by<br />necessity, exhaust one's administrative remedies. /15 Our court further<br />noted that exhaustion of such remedies is a prerequisite to judicial<br />review<br /><br /> Moreover, the purpose section of LUPA declares that:<br /> [t]he purpose of this chapter is to reform the process for judicial<br /> review of land use decisions made by local jurisdictions, by<br /> establishing uniform, expedited appeal procedures and uniform<br /> criteria for reviewing such decisions, in order to provide<br /> consistent, predictable, and timely judicial review. [/16]<br /><br /> In view of the above express statutory language and the relevant case law,<br />we conclude that courts should generally defer to local jurisdictions<br />until a final determination on the use of land is made by the highest body<br />or officer. Once made, that decision is subject to judicial review<br />according to the procedures outlined in the purpose section of the<br />statute. To hold otherwise would risk premature judicial intrusion into<br />land use decisions. Thus, the Neighbors must show that this case warrants<br />court intervention in advance of a final decision by DDES.<br /><br /> The Neighbors argue that Chelan County v. Nykreim /17 supports<br />their claim that declaratory relief, not LUPA, is proper here. There,<br />Division Three of this court concluded that LUPA is the exclusive means of<br />reviewing quasi-judicial decisions, but not of ministerial decisions. The<br />Neighbors claim here that the decision that DDES will make is ministerial<br />and thus reviewable by means other than LUPA.<br /><br /> We disagree with the conclusion in Nykreim. We hold that LUPA<br />provides the exclusive means of review for land use decisions, whether<br />they are quasi-judicial or ministerial.<br /><br /> In Nykreim, the court reviewed a declaratory judgment action in<br />which Chelan County asked the superior court to declare invalid a<br />certificate of exemption the County had granted and then withdrawn in a<br />boundary line adjustment application. /18 Concluding that LUPA "is the<br />exclusive means of review of quasi-judicial decisions, not ministerial<br />decisions," /19 the court held that "[a]ggrieved parties may challenge an<br />invalid ministerial decision granting a boundary line adjustment when<br />there is no showing that the party had an obligation to exhaust other<br />administrative remedies that would result in a final `land use decision'<br />reviewable only under LUPA." /20<br /><br /> In our view, that conclusion is contrary to the plain language of the<br />statute. We approach our reading of LUPA with the principle in mind that<br />we construe statutes as a whole to give effect to all language and to<br />harmonize all provisions. /21 The Nykreim court's conclusion<br />renders superfluous language contained in RCW 36.70C.120, the section of<br />LUPA governing the scope of judicial review of land use decisions:<br /><br /> (1) When the land use decision being reviewed was made by a quasi-<br /> judicial body or officer who made factual determinations in support<br /> of the decision, . judicial review of factual issues and the<br /> conclusions drawn from the factual issues shall be confined to the<br /> record created by the quasi-judicial body or officer, except as<br /> provided in subsections (2) through (4) of this section.<br /> . . .<br /><br /> (3) For land use decisions other than those described in<br /> subsection (1) of this section, the record for judicial review<br /> may be supplemented by evidence of material facts that were not made<br /> part of the local jurisdiction's record. [/22]<br /><br /><br />If judicial review under LUPA was limited to decisions made by quasi-<br />judicial bodies, all LUPA review would be governed by RCW 36.70C.120(1).<br />There would be no need to provide for land use decisions "other than<br />[quasi-judicial decisions]", as the Legislature expressly did in RCW<br />36.70C.120(3). The only way to give effect to the language in this<br />latter statute is to hold that LUPA review is not limited to review of<br />quasi-judicial decisions. Thus, the ministerial action of DDES in making<br />a final decision on whether or not to require a CUP permit or to issue a<br />grading permit in this case is subject to review exclusively under LUPA.<br />Accordingly, LUPA is an adequate alternative remedy here.<br /><br /> The Neighbors also argue that LUPA would not provide an adequate<br />alternative remedy if the County issued a grading permit without making a<br />final decision on the CUP. This argument is wholly unpersuasive.<br /><br /> The statutes require the County to determine whether the proposed<br />use conforms with the zoning code when it reviews grading permit<br />applications. KCC 21A.02.040 states that:<br /> (A) No use or structure shall be established, substituted, expanded,<br /> constructed, altered, moved, maintained, or otherwise changed except in<br /> conformance with this title.<br /><br />KCC 21A.42.010 states that:<br /> The following actions shall be subject to administrative review for<br /> determining compliance with the provisions of this title and/or any<br /> applicable development conditions which may affect the proposal: (A)<br /> Building permits; (B) Grading permits; and (C) Temporary use<br /> permits.<br /><br /><br /><br />If the County later fails to follow these statutes, particularly after<br />making the representations it has made to the courts in this case that it<br />must follow these statutes, the Neighbors presumably have an issue they<br />may litigate in a LUPA proceeding. In short, the Neighbors again fail to<br />show that LUPA would not be an adequate alternative remedy.<br /><br /> The Neighbors further argue that the County is required to have made the<br />CUP determination at certain points in the grading permit application<br />process that have passed and has failed to do so. In support, they cite to<br />RCW 36.70B.070, which states that within twenty-eight days after receiving<br />an application, the County must provide a written statement to a project<br />permit applicant that states either that the application is complete or<br />that the application is incomplete, listing what is lacking. The statute<br />explains that an application may be complete if it "is sufficient for<br />continued processing even though additional information may be required or<br />project modifications may be undertaken subsequently." /23<br /><br /> The Neighbors also cite WAC 197-11-440, which states that an EIS<br />must contain a fact sheet listing "all licenses which the proposal is<br />known to require." They also rely on RCW 36.70B.030, which requires that<br />a local government or reviewing body determine whether development<br />regulations applicable to the proposed project or an adopted<br />comprehensive plan define, among other things, the type of land use<br />permitted at the site, including conditional uses.<br /><br /> Finally, during oral argument, the Neighbors argued that the County's<br />failure to determine that a CUP is needed violates RCW 36.70B.110, which<br />requires local governments planning under the growth management act to<br />provide a notice of application to the public within 14 days after the<br />determination of completeness required by RCW 36.70B.070 including<br />"identification of other permits not included in the application to the<br />extent known by the local government." /24<br /><br /> Assuming without deciding that the Neighbors are correct in their<br />assertions, that does not make LUPA an inadequate alternative remedy.<br />These factual and legal issues may be addressed in a LUPA proceeding at<br />the appropriate time.<br /><br /> The Neighbors next argue that even if a LUPA action were available<br />to challenge the decision to issue the grading permit without addressing<br />the CUP, that remedy would be inadequate because it would be<br />unnecessarily harsh and stringent. We disagree.<br /><br /> Citing Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, /25 they argue that<br />declaratory relief can be available if the only alternative remedy<br />available would be an unnecessarily harsh or stringent remedy. There,<br />the court announced that where the alternate remedy was "the harsh remedy<br />of blocking or overturning an election, thereby jeopardizing a needed<br />charter review" the alternative remedies to a declaratory judgment were<br />not adequate. /26<br /><br /> Obviously, this situation is quite different from the facts of that<br />case. Requiring a party to file security as a condition of a stay in a<br />LUPA proceeding is not uncommon. And it does not rise to the level of<br />either overturning an election or avoiding a needed charter review. The<br />principle of Sorenson has no application here<br /><br /> On similar grounds, we reject the Neighbors' attempt to use CR 57 to<br />support their claim here. That rule states that "[t]he existence of<br />another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory<br />relief in cases where it is appropriate." /27 Our Supreme Court has<br />approved limited use of this exception. /28 Moreover, in Wagers v.<br />Goodwin, /29 we held that where the only alternative remedy was a<br />motion to reopen an original dissolution judgment, a remedy granted only<br />under extraordinary circumstances, the case fit into this category of<br />exceptions. /30<br /><br /> The lesson of these cases is that while declaratory relief may be<br />available if the court finds that the other available remedies are<br />unsatisfactory, such situations justifying exceptional treatment are very<br />rare. This case is not one of those rare exceptions. Because LUPA provides<br />an adequate alternative means of review, declaratory relief is not proper.<br /><br /> The Neighbors, citing the Washington Real Property Deskbook, argue<br />that a declaratory judgment action is still available in some land use<br />cases, even after passage of LUPA. Whether or not that is true, the<br />Neighbors fail to show here that declaratory relief is proper because<br />LUPA is an inadequate alternative remedy.<br /><br /> Finally, the Neighbors cite to case law from other jurisdictions that,<br />they argue, holds that declaratory judgment suits are authorized "to<br />challenge a government agency's failure to enforce its own laws." Such<br />case law is not useful in this context. Our Legislature has created the<br />LUPA framework for deciding land use questions in this state. The case law<br />and texts from other jurisdictions do not aid us in determining whether<br />LUPA provides an adequate alternative remedy in this case.<br /><br /> Ripeness<br /><br /> The County, Cadman, and Weyerhaeuser also argue that this case is not ripe<br />for review and that no justiciable controversy exists yet. We agree.<br /><br /> "[A] claim is ripe for judicial determination if the issues raised<br />are primarily legal and do not require further factual development, and<br />the challenged action is final." /31 The action challenged here is not<br />final. The County has not yet decided whether to grant the permit or<br />whether a CUP is required. Thus, one of the required elements for<br />justiciability is not present.<br /><br /> When the environmental review is completed Cadman will, presumably,<br />make final decisions about which alternatives to pursue. It is possible<br />that Cadman will choose one of the mining alternative plans that does not<br />include mining activities within one-quarter mile of the Lu residence.<br />The dispute the Neighbors present is not primarily legal. Rather, it is<br />highly factual. It is not ripe.<br /><br /> The Neighbors argue that the finality requirement does not mean that<br />a final administrative decision is required before the court can consider<br />declaratory judgment. They rely on language that ripeness depends on<br />"the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the<br />parties of withholding consideration." /32 In another case they cite,<br />the court considered declaratory judgment motions where "[a]ll of the<br />elements necessary to a determination" of the legality of the action<br />questioned were already before the court, even though the special<br />assessment the plaintiffs were contesting had not taken place and might<br />not take place for many years. /33<br /><br /> In Arnold v. Department of Retirement Systems, /34 the court<br />held that a justiciable controversy existed where Arnold filed suit to<br />determine whether the statute barring her from receiving retirement<br />benefits from her ex-husband's retirement program was unconstitutional. /35<br />Despite the acknowledged fact that Arnold would not be eligible to<br />receive the benefits, if allowed, unless her ex-husband predeceased her,<br />an event which had not occurred, the court held that her entitlement to<br />benefits presented an existing dispute between parties with genuine and<br />opposing interests.<br /><br /> The Neighbors also point to the holding in Clallam County Deputy<br />Sheriff's Guild v. Board of Clallam County Commissioners /36 to<br />support their argument. In that case, the sheriff's guild asked the<br />court to determine that a county ordinance that created a county<br />personnel system conflicted unconstitutionally with a state statute. /37<br />As the Neighbors state, the court based its decision that there was a<br />justiciable controversy even before the allegedly conflicting portions of<br />the ordinance were enforced at least in part on its finding that "the<br />deputy sheriff members of the Guild ha[d] a direct and substantial<br />interest in securing relief from the uncertainty of their legal rights<br />and obligations." /38 The court also declared that:<br /> this case raises an important constitutional question about the<br /> supremacy of state law. Because a judicial opinion will benefit the<br /> public, other branches of government and, in particular, other Home<br /> Rule Charter counties, a declaratory judgment to resolve this<br /> constitutional question is proper. [/39]<br /><br /><br /> The simple answer to the Neighbors' reliance on these cases is that<br />they are distinguishable. The legal issue in Methodist Church,<br />Arnold, and Deputy Sheriff's Guild was whether an<br />ordinance or statute violated the Constitution, an issue a court is<br />particularly qualified to decide. No further factual determination was<br />required in any of these cases to decide that issue. The sole fact left<br />to be determined in Arnold was whether Arnold's ex-husband would<br />predecease her, a fact that would not affect the constitutionality of the<br />statute. Our Supreme Court in Methodist Church also recognized<br />that the designation of the church as a historical landmark had placed<br />constraints on the church, hindering United Methodist from selling its<br />property and using the proceeds to further its religious mission. /40<br /><br /> Here, in contrast to the cited cases, there are no constitutional<br />questions at issue. Moreover, the questions are primarily factual, not<br />legal. Further factual development is necessary. The Neighbors have<br />made no showing of exceptional hardship.<br /><br /> The Neighbors also quote this court's statement in Neighbors and<br />Friends of Viretta Park that "we believe that the trial court has<br />the authority, upon a proper showing of figurative foot-dragging, to set<br />reasonable time limitations" on the city and that "judicial intervention<br />might become warranted in the face of any future unreasonable delays in<br />entry of a final administrative decision." /41 We need not decide<br />whether that dictum applies here. The Neighbors have not made a showing<br />of "figurative foot-dragging" by the County.<br /><br /> We have carefully reviewed the Neighbors' other arguments and citations<br />regarding ripeness. They are unpersuasive.<br /><br /> In sum, this case is not the proper subject of declaratory relief. There<br />is a completely adequate alternative remedy, LUPA. That option is<br />available to the Neighbors once the County makes a "land use decision"<br />within the meaning of governing statutes. The mere fact that such a<br />decision has not as yet been made does not make the LUPA remedy<br />inadequate.<br /><br /> The County, and Cadman and Weyerhaeuser also argue that a declaratory<br />judgment action may not be employed to challenge the application or<br />administration of a statute. Because we have decided on other grounds that<br />a declaratory judgment action is inappropriate, we need not reach that<br />argument.<br /><br /><br /> Conflict of Interest<br /><br /> The Neighbors argue that the court should impose its view of whether a CUP<br />is required before the County makes a decision because the County has a<br />clear conflict of interest. According to the Neighbors, it would be futile<br />to wait for the County to make a decision against its own interests. We<br />reject this highly unusual request.<br /><br /> The Neighbors cite a series of cases relating to futility, none of<br />which considers a declaratory judgment action. Futility is generally<br />raised in the context of an appeal of a decision where the appellant has<br />failed to exhaust administrative remedies and pleads that exhausting<br />these remedies would be futile. The question of futility is one for the<br />court. /42 But even the policies underlying exhaustion impose a<br />substantial burden on a litigant attempting to show futility. /43 The<br />factual circumstances of a case rarely justify a finding of futility. /44<br /><br /> The court in Orion Corp. v. State of Washington /45 held<br />that the facts of the case justified a finding of futility. But there<br />the State and County governments had made policy choices, embodied in<br />legislation and agency action, which would have prevented any development<br />of Orion's land. /46 Even if the County's conflict of interest motivated<br />its delay in making a decision in this case, as the Neighbors allege,<br />they fail to show that the County necessarily will not follow the<br />ordinance and make a decision.<br /><br /> The majority of the other cases they cite discuss the appearance of<br />fairness doctrine. /47 As the County correctly points out, application<br />of the appearance of fairness doctrine is limited to review of quasi-<br />judicial actions of local decision-making bodies. /48 Jackstadt v.<br />Washington State Patrol applies the provisions of the Administrative<br />Procedures Act regarding disqualification of reviewing officers in<br />adjudicative proceedings. /49 The Neighbors do not argue that that<br />statute governs this decision. Ritter v. Board of Commissioners of<br />Adams County Public Hospital Dist. 1 /50 considers the<br />disqualification of a single member of an adjudicative board, not the<br />disqualification of an entire agency. Altogether these cases provide a<br />good survey of the many situations in which an impartial decision-maker<br />is required. They do not provide authority for removing the decision<br />from DDES in this case. None of the cases cited holds that an agency, as<br />a whole, should not be allowed to proceed with this sort of decision<br />because of suggestions of conflict of interest.<br /> We affirm the order dismissing the case.<br /><br /> AGID, and GROSSE, JJ., concur.
AI算命大師
前一個議題
索引
